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The Challenge for Asian Jurisdictions in 
the Development of International 
Criminal Justice 
Mark Findlay∗ 
Abstract 
The paper reviews the different frameworks for international criminal justice in which China’s 
influence can be measured, or should be present, looking specifically at procedural traditions on which 
international criminal law and its jurisprudence are said to be based. Understanding China as a 
transitional hybrid criminal justice model undergoing radical transformation in its justice delivery and 
discourse, it is argued, assists significantly in forecasting where the synthesis of international criminal 
procedure may be heading. Attached to a re-interpretation and critique of individualised liability is the 
unpacking of China’s in principle commitment to communitarian rights and social protection as a 
foundation for its criminal justice model. How might a similar normative direction influence the 
diversification and ‘rights’ perceptions of international criminal justice? In particular, in today’s 
China, which is experiencing a rapid and relentless reconfiguration of communitarian identity and 
obligation, will collective rights commitments survive to influence the development of domestic 
criminal justice? 
From a more formalist consideration of international criminal justice, the paper explores what 
‘alternative’ global justice paradigms offer China, and vice versa. Speculation on the opportunities 
available to China in regional and international governance, through more constructive involvement 
with international criminal justice is proposed against a call for a wider consideration of rights 
paradigms in so far as they recognise community interests as well as individual integrity. The strain 
between these priorities reveals how Asian states could find it more difficult to administer domestic 
criminal justice in accordance with the rightful demands of international conventions. 
I Introduction 
International criminal justice is at a cross-roads.  
With the first indictments before the International Criminal Court the challenge is now whether 
the court will follow simply the legality determined through the international criminal tribunals, or 
develop a new jurisprudence to promote world order and a peaceful global community. 
The differential emergence of international criminal justice has seen preferred and hegemonic 
procedural traditions exert disproportionate influence over the institutional development of formal 
global justice processes. Competing explanations for the origins of trial-based international criminal 
justice selectively emphasise either trial-based or alternative justice paradigms. Even so, it is 
increasingly becoming recognised that the new and legitimate constituency for international criminal 
justice are ‘victim communities’.1 As such there is a need to transform international trial processes 
better to reflect legitimate victim interests.2 Along the way to achieving this there will be necessarily 
an expanded role for judicial and prosecutorial discretion to manage the greater range of non-
                                                 
∗  Professor of Criminal Justice, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney; Professor of Law, Law School, Singapore Management 
University. The article addresses challenges both to Asian jurisdictions in a global context, and for Asian jurisdictions in 
influencing the development of international criminal justice. While the principal central and east Asian jurisdictions of 
China and Japan are the empirical locus of the paper, they represent common challenges for hybrid procedural traditions 
outside the European mainstream and in essential transition in the context of modernisation.  
1  For a detailed discussion of this and its problematic procedural ramifications for the transformed trial, see Mark Findlay and 
Ralph Henham, Beyond Punishment: Achieving International Criminal Justice (Palgrave, 2010) ch 3. It is not necessary to 
see the victim focus theme, and the later discussion of communitarian justice as one and the same challenge. Victim-centred 
ICJ may be fostered through communitarian ethics and organisation, but it more specifically requires a legal/procedural 
location to achieve its full potential. 
2  Mark Findlay and Ralph Henham, Transforming International Criminal Justice: Retributive and Restorative Justice in the 
Trial Process (Willan Publishing, 2005). 
206 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 32:205 
                                                
adversarial outcomes that will characterise the transformed trial.3 This paper discusses briefly the 
procedural opportunities offered by Asian hybrid criminal justice traditions such as China and Japan 
where some of the central elements for the transformed international trial already have purchase. In 
addition, the paper reflects on the reconsideration of rights at the heart of due process in a more 
procedurally rich fair global trial. 
The paper commences by summarising the different frameworks for international criminal 
justice in which China’s influence can be measured, or should be present. The analysis looks 
specifically at procedural traditions on which international criminal law and its jurisprudence are said 
to be based. Understanding China as a transitional hybrid criminal justice model undergoing radical 
transformation in its justice delivery and discourse may assist significantly in forecasting where the 
synthesis of international criminal procedure may be heading. Attached to a re-interpretation and 
critique of individualised liability is the unpacking of China’s in principle commitment to 
communitarian rights and social protection as a foundation for its criminal justice model. How might a 
similar normative direction influence the diversification and ‘rights’ perceptions of international 
criminal justice? In particular, in today’s China, which is experiencing a rapid and relentless 
reconfiguration of communitarian identity and obligation, will collective rights commitments survive to 
influence the development of domestic criminal justice? 
From a more formalist consideration of international criminal justice, the paper moves out to 
examine what the ‘alternative’ global justice paradigms offer China, and vice versa. This is a platform 
from which to speculate on the opportunities available to China in regional and international 
governance, through more constructive involvement with international criminal justice. As with 
China’s active role in international commercial arbitration, there is potential for it to influence the 
development of international criminal justice beyond a formal institutional base. In some respects this 
perspective allows engagement with themes like adversarial justice and human rights, beyond rather 
narrow and irredentist normative debates around individuality, and enables some progress from 
constitutional legality to progressive communitarian practice.  
Where the analysis moves to an examination of rights and international criminal justice we call 
for a wider consideration of rights paradigms in so far as they recognise community interests as well as 
individual integrity. The strain between these priorities provides insight into why certain nation-states 
such as China find it more difficult to administer domestic criminal justice in accordance with the 
rightful demands of international conventions.4 
II Why a ‘China Focus’ for Developing International Criminal Justice? 
That China remains outside the constitution of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and is not yet a 
State Party to the Rome Statute,5 might challenge even the relevance of this question. The purpose of 
this paper is not only to argue that China is importantly positioned to influence international criminal 
justice in the future, but also that there are many aspects of international criminal justice (properly 
interpreted) where China can already have sway. To make this case it is crucial to unpack the essentials 
of international criminal justice in order that possible theatres of influence are more obvious. The first 
part of this paper is concerned with this challenge. 
As argued in Transforming International Criminal Justice,6 there are much more than formal 
institutions constituting international criminal justice. Misleadingly referred to as ‘alternative justice 
paradigms’, the ‘truth and reconciliation’ pathways and ‘transitional justice entities’, have greater 
influence and coverage over victim communities7 than can be claimed by the international criminal 
 
3  Findlay and Henham, above n 1, chs 5, 6 and 7. 
4  Evidence of these tensions in the Chinese context, against instances of individual and institutional abuses of power and 
miscarriages of justice are described in great detail in Elisa Nesossi, ‘Limits to the Protection of Suspect’s Rights at the Pre-
trial Stage: The PRC’s application of criminal justice and human rights standards’ (Research Report, 2007) (copy on file 
with author). 
5  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into force 
1 July 2002) (‘Rome Statute’). This is the empowering legislation for the International Criminal Court (ICC) settled by the 
UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. 
6  Findlay and Henham, above n 2. 
7  This notion is explored in ibid ch 8. It invites consideration of international crime victimisation beyond individual harm or 
even generic notions of ‘humanity’. 
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tribunals. Bearing this in mind, international criminal justice should not just be seen within a retributive 
framework. Restorative justice has also emerged as an important and legitimate expectation of victim 
communities.8 
What remains of communitarian control frameworks still influential locally in China today,9 and 
the normative emphasis on ‘social harmony’ as a primary motivator for Chinese criminal justice they 
could be said to complement, suggest important potential cohesions with the development of 
restorative and less formal international criminal justice. The possibilities presented for China to 
influence the development of international criminal justice from this platform, are critically evaluated. 
International criminal justice is employed increasingly, often following armed struggle, as a 
supplementary governance strategy for state reconstruction. Central to global governance in its current 
configuration is the nexus between crime and risk, control and security.10 Regional and international 
concerns over risk and security where dominant global alliances now determine to control international 
terrorism are features of international criminal justice from which China, and indeed the tiger Asian 
economies, cannot exclude themselves.  
III Frameworks for International Criminal Justice 
While international criminal justice — if we narrow it down to the arena of war crimes tribunals — 
clearly originated as a response to human rights atrocities, the motives underlying its emergence are the 
subject of much debate. The argument divides around the essential protection of humanity from new 
crimes and harms which only a global justice response can satisfy, or a wider mandate employing 
international criminal justice to advance the dominant political hegemony. These motivations are not 
mutually exclusive, and in fact they are crucially interdependent if the protection of humanity is to 
devolve from persistent military intervention. The critics of this alliance suspect that the more 
independent aspirations for justice will be captured by a dominant political ideology designating the 
legitimate global community, and the citizens worthy of protection.11 
A International criminal justice — A genuine humanitarian 
response? 
Proponents of this view hold that the phenomenon of international criminal justice and its practical 
manifestations are rooted genuinely in a universal desire to protect human rights and to redress those 
that have been violated.12 Several of the distinct justifications articulated by the Permanent Members of 
the Security Council (such as China) for the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), when translated into general terms, can be seen to constitute the normative 
motivations behind international criminal justice viewed as a genuine humanitarian response.13 Even 
so, these general pronouncements are pregnant with complex and competing considerations to:14 
 
8  Mark Findlay, ‘Activating Victim Constituency in International Criminal Justice’ (2009) 3 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 183. 
9  See Lena Zhong and Roderic Broadhurst, ‘Building Little Safe and Civilised Communities: Community Crime Prevention 
with Chinese Characteristics?’ (2007) 51 International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 52 for a 
discussion of the pressures at work on communitarian control in the cities as China transforms economically, and the 
Chinese workforce breaks free of the household registration system. 
10  The nature and consequences of this nexus is analysed in Mark Findlay, Crisis What Crisis: Legal Regulation in New 
Visions of Global Risk and Security (Collumpton, Willan Publishing) (forthcoming). 
11  Mark Findlay, ‘Terrorism and Relative Justice’ (2007) 47 Crime, Law and Social Change 57–68. 
12  See, eg: Louise Arbour, ‘Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice’ (1997) 21 Fordham International Law 
Journal 531; Antonio Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 1; David 
Wippman, ‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 
473; Aurélien J Colson, ‘The Logic of Peace and the Logic of Justice’ (2000) 15 International Relations 51; Michael P 
Scharf, ‘The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New Millenium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal’ (2000) 49 International Criminal Justice 925; Javaid Rehman, ‘The Influence of International Human Rights Law 
upon Criminal Justice Systems’ (2002) 66 Journal of Criminal Law 510; A Clapham, ‘Issues of Complexity, Complicity and 
Complementarity: From the Nuremberg Trials to the Dawn of the New International Criminal Court’ in P Sands (ed), From 
Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 30. 
13  These justifications are set out and discussed in Scharf, above n 12, 928–33. 
14  For a wider discussion of these see Mark Findlay and Clare McLean, ‘Emerging International Criminal Justice’ (2007) 18 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 457. 
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(a) provide justice for the victims; 
(b) establish accountability for individual perpetrators; 
(c) facilitate restoration of peace; 
(d) develop an accurate historical record; 
(e) deter perpetration of atrocities elsewhere. 
B International criminal justice — A politically motivated 
response 
The contrary position, however, is that the commonly purported justifications above disguise less 
altruistic motivations — ‘Surely, international criminal justice also tells another story, one that is at 
least more ambiguous, more fraught with power’.15 At the heart of this view is the disbelief that these 
reasons above provide an adequate answer to the question: ‘why would states ever bother to create 
institutions that might end up turning against them … ?’.16 
In support of a more sceptical stance, Megret and Scharf point to the fact that the ICTY was 
‘remarkably under-funded’17 during its first years in operation, ‘a toy in the hands of the great powers 
… reined in whenever it showed signs of threatening the status quo’.18 Yet despite these ‘dismal 
beginnings’,19 the judges of the ICTY have ‘transform[ed] themselves into crusading diplomats’;20 as 
such ‘a thorough mix of liberal legalism and realist interest is what characterize[d] the emergence and 
consolidation of international criminal justice towards the end of the twentieth century’.21 It remains to 
be seen ‘how far international criminal justice’s “own momentum” will take it’.22  
Local and international criminal justice both are revealed through their institutions and 
processes as much as it may be in the normative aspirations for its outcomes. With international 
criminal justice, however, the aims of formal justice uncomfortably escape into the communitarian 
expectations commonly held by alternate justice forms. Debate about the appropriateness of this cross 
over, and the manner in which it challenges the formal/informal justice demarcation has characterised 
the rather limited analysis of international criminal justice’s origination and development to date.23 
1 Formal institutions at work 
As Scharf argues, ‘[i]t is one thing to create an international institution devoted to enforcing 
international justice; it is quite another to make international justice work’.24 For some, that the ICC as 
the centrepiece of formal international criminal justice has no constabulary, no subpoena power and 
cannot sanction states directly in the event of non-compliance, may make this latter objective 
impossible to achieve.25 Questionable enforcement capacity does not bode well for the proposed 
deterrent effect of the international tribunals and the ICC,26 casting serious doubt on optimistic 
proclamations such as ‘[t]he real story of the new Court may actually be the crimes which never take 
place’.27  
 
15  Frederic Megret, ‘The Politics of International Criminal Justice’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 1261, 
1267. 
16  Ibid 1267 
17  Scharf, above n 12, 934. 
18  Megret, above n 15, 1275. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid 1277. 
21  Ibid 1281. 
22  Ibid 1282. 
23  Mirjan Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83(1) Chicago Kent Law Review 329; Findlay 
and Henham, above n 1, ch 8. 
24  Scharf, above n 12, 927. 
25  Eg, ibid; Mirela Roznovschi, ‘Book Review: Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of 
International Law: Justice for the New Millenium’, (2003) 31 International Journal of Legal Information 120. 
26  Lowell Goddard, ‘The Globalisation of Criminal Justice: Will the International Criminal Court become a Reality?’ (2000) 7 
Canterbury Law Review 452, 464 argues otherwise: ‘And even if only a few of the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, or war crimes are held to account, their examples may serve to deter others similarly minded, and that in itself will 
be a resounding victory for all humanity’. This view should be compared with the in-depth evaluation put forward by 
Wippman, above n 12, which concludes the uncertainty of the deterrent effect. 
27  Clapham, above n 12, 67. 
2010] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 209 
                                                
For Colson, ‘[t]he starting point [in responding to this question] is to conceive of international 
justice as a process which in itself has significance, no matter what the expected outcomes of the 
process are’.28 In general, international tribunals ensure that collective assignation of guilt is avoided.29 
The overall effect then is one of catharsis.30  
Akhavan provides support for the view of international criminal justice as manifest beyond the 
trials conducted in its name. He argues that the mere ‘stigmatization of criminal conduct may have far-
reaching consequences, promoting post conflict reconciliation and changing the broader rules of 
international relations and legitimacy’.31 Akhavan also agrees with Colson that the international 
tribunals play a valuable role for victims in ensuring that the crimes against them ‘do not fall into 
oblivion’.32 In these ways, international criminal justice manifests itself in a ‘significant contribut[ion] 
to peace building in post war societies’ and through the introduction of ‘criminal accountability into the 
culture of international relations’.33 Notably these achievements correspond to the broader 
justifications for the creation of the international tribunals. 
International criminal justice is also declared in national criminal law. Booth proposes that the 
function of an ICC trial will be ‘first and foremost a proclamation that certain conduct is unacceptable 
to the world community’.34 This proclamation has already been made, and continues to be made, with 
domestic legislation having been enacted worldwide bringing the national criminal law of more and 
more countries into line with the Rome Statute. Each such enactment represents a step closer to 
Clapham’s ‘trans-national legal order’.35 Whether this translates into the internationalisation of 
criminal justice for a ‘global’ (as opposed to parochial) community remains to be seen. 
2 Alternative paradigms in the gap 
Certainly international criminal justice is not purely the domain of international trial institutions and 
the processes which flow, or are purported to flow, from them. Expansive efforts to create an 
international criminal justice outside the framework of criminal prosecution are identifiable, the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) being a celebrated example. In the South African 
case, amnesty was offered in return for ‘full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts 
associated with a political objective’36 — as Dyzenhaus points out, this led some to believe that justice, 
seemingly being unlikely to be achieved given the continuing strength of the old regime, had been 
traded for the truth.37 The opposing view is that justice was not negotiated, or sacrificed, but rather ‘the 
way the TRC went about finding out the truth achieved a kind of justice different from — even 
superior to — criminal or retributive justice’,38 namely restorative justice. While this latter view is 
arguably the more convincing of the two, perhaps its most pertinent point is the implied dichotomy of 
criminal/retributive justice and restorative justice.  
In any such analysis, the two seem to be posited as mutually exclusive, incapable of happy 
coexistence. In the context of international criminal justice, it has been established this dichotomy is 
false.39 A comparative exploration of the objectives underlying both the ‘formal’ institutional attempts 
at international criminal justice and the ‘informal’ community approaches shows, not only that the two 
can, with institutional transformation, coexist in a transitional context, but that there is also significant 
scope for restorative themes to be incorporated into the procedural framework of international trials. 
 
28  Colson, above n 12, 58. 
29  Ibid; C Booth, ‘Prospects and issues for the International Criminal Court: lessons from Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ in P Sands 
(ed) From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 185. 
30  Colson, above n 12, 59. 
31  Payam Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?’ (2001) 95 American 
Journal of International Law 7. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid 9. 
34  Booth, above n 29, 178. 
35  Clapham, above n 12, 65. 
36  Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995. Cited in Cassese, above n 12, 4. 
37  David Dyzenhaus, ‘Judicial Independence, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 10 Otago Law Review 345, 366. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Findlay and Henham, above n 2, chs 7 and 8. 
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3 Justice for Victims? Focus for emerging international criminal justice 
For those victims who do testify as victim witnesses at international criminal tribunals, what is the 
impact of having their stories selectively constructed, destroyed, and reconstructed in examination and 
cross-examination? Not only are their experiences distorted, but they are taken out of their hands 
completely and retold through the voice of professionals. This loss of ownership, along with the 
procedurally-enforced restraints preventing the accurate telling of their stories, will more likely lead to 
increased frustration and dissatisfaction for victims than it will to catharsis. They will not feel, as 
Colson argues they will, that their status as victims is ‘being taken seriously by the international 
community through one if its institutions’.40 
When notions of individualised criminal liability are employed in contexts where the collective 
rights of victims have little actionable purchase, the outcomes can be a process of further victimisation 
through justice interventions and its consequences. As the experiences of the truth and reconciliation 
commissions reveal41 the compromise of the individual rights of the ‘storyteller’ for the greater good of 
story telling requires a wider recognition of the legitimate interests of victim communities. Through an 
emphasis on community wellbeing as an objective for criminal justice, the hybrid justice traditions 
such as China hold out in principle at least a model for alternative justice strategies not to ride rough 
shod over victims’ rights in the pursuit of reconciliation and state reconstruction. 
Despite the recognition that alternative paradigms representing international criminal justice are 
very significant when conceptualising its scope, it is the form and jurisdiction of the international 
justice institutions and the ICC in particular which has divided many of the super powers such as 
China, from the body of UN states working towards a powerful and pervasive international criminal 
court. 
IV China and the ICC42 
Placing aside Japan, of the global powers the three states currently refusing to cooperate with the ICC 
(Russia, the USA and China) have the largest military capacity in their regions. Burns does not see this 
as a coincidence. Despite the domestic legal obligations required by the Rome Statute and concerns 
over the loss of autonomy which these may suggest: 
As an emerging military ‘superpower’, China has much in common with the United States in its 
wariness towards the ICC. In both cases these states have powerful military establishments that 
have developed their own military judicial systems that they will not easily give up any part of.43 
However, Lu and Wang44 observe that unlike the USA, China does not have extensive overseas 
military commitments and therefore it is not so concerned (as is the US) that its troops may one day 
come under the ICC jurisdiction. Also, China is not in the same international position as is the USA to 
pressure through economic sanction, for the creation of bilateral agreements indemnifying troops 
against local prosecution. 
When the Rome Statute was signed by an overwhelming number of UN member states, China 
was unexpectedly one of the seven countries to vote against it. China remains among the very few 
states not to sign, ratify or accede to the treaty.45 What makes this all the more curious is that China 
was active in the plenary sessions of the Rome Conference and adopts a watching brief on the progress 
of the courts development, from the perspective of an observer state. 
The reasons set out by the Chinese government for not joining the ICC are: 
1. The Rome Statute is not a voluntary acceptance instrument and imposes obligations on 
nation states and non-state parties without their consent, which violates the Vienna 
 
40  Colson, above n 12, 58. 
41  Jeremy Sarkin, ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa’ (1997) 23 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 528. 
42  See Lu Jianping and Wang Zhixiang, ‘China’s Attitude towards the ICC’(2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
608. 
43  Peter Burns, ‘Some Features of the International Criminal Court’ (Paper presented at Canada China Procuratorate Reform 
Cooperation Programme, Xi’an, Shaanxi Province and Lanzhou, Gansu Province, August 2005) 3. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Even the US has reluctantly signed on. 
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V Procedural Traditions for International Criminal Law – China’s Place? 
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w and the laws of war 
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Convention on the Law on Treaties. Furthermore, the complementary jurisdiction 
principle gives the ICC the power to judge whether a state is willing or able to conduct 
proper trials of its own nationals. 
2. War crimes committed in internal armed conflicts fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
The definition of war crimes goes beyond that accepted under customary internation
law. 
3. Contrary to the existing norms of customary international law, the definition of ‘crimes 
against humanity’ does not require that the state in which they are committed be at war. 
Many of the actions listed under t
rights law and not criminal law. 
4. The inclusion of the crime of aggression
power of the UN Security Council; and 
5. The power under art 15 for the Prosecutor to initiate action (proprio motu) might make it 
difficult for the ICC to
to political influence. 
These arguments are the subject of wide-ranging and sometimes critical discussion among 
Chinese jurists and legal scholars.46 Lu and Wang have presented detailed argument challenging the 
currency and cogency of each. They conclude that, ‘
pate in order to protect its national interests’.  
Rather than deal with each of the arguments against China’s reaso
useful to focus on those where its national self-interest is a clear motivation: 
• The purpose of the ICC is to punish ‘crimes against humanity’. There is no reason beyond 
the political why such a motive should be limited in its impact and direction to situations of 
war. ‘Crimes against humanity’ do not take on their abhorrent characteristics from the 
theatre of war alone. The definition of war in international law may not cover those 
contexts of armed conflict internal to state sovereignty and transition, where in man
these atrocities are committed which are exactly what the ICC was set up to prosecute. 
• The doctrine of complementarity protects those states with the capacity properly to 
investigate and prosecute crimes that otherwise come to the attention of the ICC. This is the 
challenge. Judicial sovereignty is not an essential casualty of the limited submission of 
autonomy required by ICC members
domestic criminal justice responses. 
• It is only state parties to the Rome Statute tha
determining the definition of crimes of aggression. 
• Candidates fo
In discussing the influences behind the development of internat
(1) International humanitarian la
(2) International human rights law 
(3) Domestic (national) criminal law
(4) Trans
What we have ended up with are people coming from these different backgrounds, bringing with 
them different ideas about the role of law in protecting human rights. For example, criminal law is 
concerned with protecting the defendant’s rights and with individual guilt. International human 
rights law, on the other-hand, is very victim focused … in contrast to the rule of lenity of criminal 
law, where you’re going to construe prohibitions narrowly so that you’re not catching people 
unawares as defendants, in human rights law the corresponding interpretative canon is to interpret 
 
46  Lu and Wang, above n 42, n 9. 
47  Ibid 618–19. 
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human rights more expansively to protect the rights of individuals. In international criminal law 
you can see the confluence of these two s
direction, and other times there is tension.  
The development of international criminal law and the procedural jurisprudence on which it relies is 
steeped in the compromise of the major legal traditions. None of the criminal procedural traditions 
remains ‘pure’ as a consequence of modernisation and colonialism. Hybridity is the catchword for 
procedural development in domestic criminal justice. As such, hybrid traditions should be the drivers 
of institutional and procedural international criminal justice. As such, international criminal law and its 
procedures, if they are truly to reflect a m
 in the hybridisation phenomenon. 
On tensions in procedural foundations Zhang observes: 
The Chinese Criminal justice system is very different from western justice systems. Influenced by 
Confucian communitarian49 ideology and communist philosophy, mass organisations at the 
grassroots level play a very important role in crime control.50 Mediation committees and bang jiao 
groups exist in nearly every local community to deal with minor deviancies, resolve conflicts, and 
rehabilitate juvenile delinquents and released offenders. While the formal criminal justice system is 
used for more serious offenders, mass participation in co
an integral part of the Chinese criminal justice system.  
In imperial China the Tang and the Qing Criminal Codes were notable and sophisticated. The 
central purposes of these codes were to punish those who violated the rule of order, and the value of 
good conduct. Leng and Chiu52 argue that these traditional codes paid less attention to the protection of 
individual interests, than to the maintenance of social and political order. In this respect they were 
compatible in function to the more recent Chinese crime legislation. To some extent the Codes could be 
seen in conflict with Confucian legal theory which advocates ruling by moral education, with the law 
and its sanctions used only as the last resort. Punishment was still
 moral education was rejected by the individual.   
The People’s Republic of China was established as a socialist country in 1949. Since then, 
efforts have been made to enact basic laws concerning criminal justice administration. It was in 1979, 
after the anarchy of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, that the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law 
were originally enacted. At the same time, laws concerning the organisation and function of the courts 
and public prosecution were also developed. Basic laws with regard to lawyers, arrest and detention of 
suspects, also have been established. With the return of Hong Kong, and then Macau as Special 
Administrative Regions within China, the criminal law now a
 and Portuguese criminal procedure and jurisprudence 
The Chinese criminal law54 takes the political ideologies of Marxism, Leninism and Mao 
Zedong as its guide. It proclaims that its tasks are to use criminal punishments to struggle against all 
counter-revolutionary and other criminal acts in order to safeguard the system of the people's 
democratic dictatorship and the smooth progress of the course of socialist re-construction. In the early 
days of the Chinese soviet, the legal traditions of the USSR were heavily influential. Prior to that, 
 
48  Eric Nee, ‘International Criminal Law: A Conversation with Professor Jenny S Martinez’ (Winter 2006) Stanford Lawyer 
35, 36. 
49  To make a simple causal connection between Chinese communitarian traditions and a complementary communist ideology, 
even if possible, would not be convincing for analysing contemporary Chinese criminal justice. The latter in its procedures, 
and the paradox between its due process language and its sectarian practice, advances state interests rather than any more 
communitarian hegemony.  
50  Eg, in the control of gambling see Mark Findlay and Ugi Zvekic, Informal Mechanisms of Crime Control — A Cross 
Cultural Perspective (UNSDRI, 1988); Mark Findlay and Ugi Zvekic, Alternative Policing Styles: Cross Cultural 
Perspectives (Kluwer, 1993). 
51  X Zhang, A Restorative Justice Audit of the Chinese Criminal Justice System (MSc thesis, London School of Economics, 
2004) 2. 
52  Shao-Chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu, Criminal Justice in Post Mao China: Analysis and documents (State University of NY 
Press, 1985). 
53  Chen Xiang, ‘Community Policing Strategies: A Chinese approach to crime control’ (2002) 12 Policing Society 1. 
54  This discussion of the historical development of Chinese criminal law and procedure is bare and basic. It is only intended 
here to serve as background for appreciating the contemporary tensions at work in Chinese criminal justice which foment a 
procedural hybrid with experience to inform similar challenges faced by nascent international criminal procedure. 
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impact of the laws of imperial China is perhaps most clearly survived in the institutional structures of 
Chinese criminal justice. 
It took 30 years for the People’s Republic of China to enact its first laws. Until 1979 there were 
no legislative legal standards to guide judges to try criminals. The criminal law takes the Constitution 
as its basis. Article 28 of the Constitution stipulates that: 
The State maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and other criminal activities that 
endanger State security; it penalizes acts that endanger public security and disrupt the socialist 
economy and other criminal activities, and punishes and reforms criminals.55 
The Chinese government revised the Criminal Procedure Law in 1996 and the Criminal Law in 
1997.56 The revisions promised increased protection for criminal suspects and defendants and a fairer 
trial process.57 The amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law included an expansion of the right to 
counsel, a more meaningful role for defence attorneys during the pre-trial and trial stages, and other 
measures to address the problem of ‘decision first, trial later’ (xian ding hou shen). The amended 
Criminal Law abolished the provision on ‘analogy’ contained in the 1979 Criminal Law. Under this 
provision, a person could be punished for an act that was not explicitly prohibited by law at the time 
the act was committed by providing for punishment according to the closest analogous provision of the 
Criminal Law.58 The revised Criminal Law also replaced ‘counter-revolutionary’ crimes with ‘crimes 
of endangering national security’ as part of an effort to depoliticise criminal law, at least on paper. 
A wide discrepancy often exists in China between the law on paper and the law in practice. 
Criminal suspects and defendants frequently do not enjoy the enhanced protections found in the revised 
laws. Excessive pre-trial detention has not been stamped out. Legal representation, widespread as it 
now may be is compromised by regular instances where public security organs detain and punish active 
defence advocates. The presumptions of innocence, and against self incrimination, constitutionally 
accorded, and declared in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which 
China has signed, are common casualties in criminal justice delivery. Torture remains a feature of 
policing practice.  
Although the revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law and the Criminal Law reflect progress 
toward internationally recognised criminal justice standards as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the ICCPR, and other international human rights documents, the administration of 
criminal justice in China has been criticised for falling far short of international standards.59 These 
criticisms should be seen against the prominence given in China to communitarian over individual 
rights. In addition, the excesses of a one party state, and its functionaries with little regard for the law 
in practice, should not be confused with an institutionalised commitment to subvert international rights 
conventions. 
Most legal scholars have not completely abandoned the idea of ‘Chinese characteristics’ or 
‘China’s social situation’ for explaining the actual discrepancies between the PRC’s CPL and 
international standards, but they speak about it in quite flat and unconvincing tones. Moreover, 
they often identify China’s retrograde legal mentality as one of the key factors that hinder legal 
progress and reforms … (following on from the administration’s recent denunciation of the 
excesses of public justice officials, the state) demonstrates its benevolence in its willingness to 
defend individual rights and it makes obvious to its citizens that criminal justice reforms are an 
actual ‘Chinese necessity’ and not an imposition from abroad. On the other side, in promoting 
 
55  Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. 
56  Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susongfa] (People’s 
Republic of China) National People’s Congress, adopted 1 July 1979, revised 17 March 1996 (‘Criminal Procedure Law’); 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa] (People’s Republic of China) 
National People’s Congress, Order No 83, revised 14 March 1997 (‘Criminal Law’). 
57  See generally, Jonathan Hecht, Opening to Reform? An Analysis of China’s Revised Criminal Procedure Law (Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, October 1996); Donald C Clarke, ‘Wrongs and Rights: A Human Rights Analysis of China’s 
Revised Criminal Law’ (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, December 1998). 
58  In theory, the abolition of analogy brings the Criminal Law into conformity with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no 
crime without law making it so), which is expressed in art 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘No one shall 
be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under 
national or international law, at the time when it was committed’. 
59  Congressional Executive Committee on China, Annual Report 2002 
<http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/crimjustice/crimeannrept02.php> at 29 June 2010. 
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ideas of proceduralism and respect of human rights, it internationally shows its goodwill to adhere 
to international standards.60 
However, as Nesossi rightly observes, criminal justice reform in China cannot be entirely 
explained as an effort to enhance state legitimacy, domestically and internationally. Pressures coming 
out of rapid changes in Chinese social order, which in turn have increased the significance of crime and 
the fragility of conventional approaches to control, have required a re-interpretation of the relationship 
between the offender, the victim and state institutions. In addition, legal academics and professionals, 
as well as activists with a growing voice are pushing for rights-based reforms. Above all this, the 
Chinese compromise of individual rights and social security prevails negotiated as it will continue to be 
by the interests of the one party state. 
The debate about the compliance of Chinese criminal justice in practice with international 
human rights will be distorted if taken exclusively from perspectives outside Chinese legal and social 
traditions. Both Confucian and Chinese communist philosophies emphasise order over freedom, duty 
over rights and group interests over those of the individual.61 ‘The main objective of the Chinese 
criminal justice system is to protect, first of all, the socialist order, and next, the people’s personal 
rights.’62 
The challenge for a relevant ‘rights and justice’ debate in China is to recognise the political 
force of collective and state interests over the protection of the individual, while not sacrificing the 
sharp edge of international human rights conventions. This is in light of the invitation to emphasise the 
significance of criminal justice in protecting the individual as well as the collective, through the 
Constitution’s celebration of constitutional legality, and the invocation of the rule of law. 
Article 3 of the Chinese Criminal Law provides that offenders ‘shall be determined and 
punished … in accordance with the law’. Besides art 33 of the Constitution, art 4 of the Criminal Law 
states, ‘Anyone who commits a crime shall be equal in applying the law. No one is privileged to be 
beyond the law.’ Article 5 equates punishment with the crime committed and the criminal 
responsibility to be borne by the offender. 
When it comes to pre-eminent considerations of individual rights like that of the victim as an 
essential paradigm for international criminal justice, Chinese criminal law presents the rights of the 
individual (even victims) as subordinate to the public duty to control crime when there is a conflict 
between the two. This is despite provisions allowing for civil claims along with criminal prosecution. 
Provisions for victim participation in mediation and the trial process, as well as the opportunities for 
compensation,63 mean that the protection of victim interests are in keeping with the intentions of the 
Rome Statute, the practice of the international criminal tribunals, and are consistent with international 
rights conventions. These are not merely symbolic balances against abuse of power and miscarriages of 
justice. For instance, the Supreme People’s Court President Xiao Yang recently indicated that legal 
action by the public against government officials had risen in the past 6 years, with an average of 
100 000 cases now being heard each year.64 Echoing the concern of the Chinese Politburo Standing 
Committee about unjust official practice, a senior member said: 
The Party and the country have attached great importance to administrative trial work. 
Administrative litigation plays an indispensable function in realising the rule of law, building a 
lawful socialist country, and forging a harmonious society.65 
This said, the translation of constitutional legality in the form of due process into Chinese 
criminal justice is a suspect as the state’s ideological commitment to communitarianism. ‘One-party’ 
state politics is not conducive to accountable justicial power particularly in a tradition of governance 
 
60  Nesossi, above n 4, 19–20. 
61  Leng and Chiu, above n 52, 171. 
62  Ibid 123. 
63  Article 14(6) of the ICCPR creates a right to compensation for miscarriages of justice. According to art 15 of the PRC State 
Compensation Law, victims can claim compensation if an investigative, procuratorial, judicial or prison organ infringes their 
rights by, among other things, wrongful detention or arrest without substantiated strong suspicion or sufficient incriminating 
facts. 
64  Irene Wang ‘People’s Legal Action on the Rise’, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 30 March 2007, 8 
65  Ibid. 
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such as in China where historically and recently law is not above politics, or constitutional law superior 
to executive administration.66 
VI Alternative International Criminal Justice67 — the Way Forward for 
China? 
Some might say that to suggest China’s traditional (normative) communitarian system of social order 
provides an alternative criminal justice paradigm of restorative justice through mediation that could be 
usefully applied in international criminal justice involves a categorical misunderstanding. First, 
traditional communitarianism has changed through single party communism, then to a greater extent in 
modern urban China and is now even under threat in China’s modernist/materialist self perception. 
Second, even the traditional communitarian system privileged social order over the individual, in a way 
that enhanced the interests of the state, rather than, as we understand it, as a way of meeting the needs 
of civil society.  
In the contemporary Chinese justice system, whether retributive or restorative, the state is even 
more dominant. This means that, rather than just considering the needs of victim and perpetrator, in 
China their needs are always subordinate to that higher authority. Therefore, how in such a state 
dominated justice system it is possible to see the genuine development of an ‘alternative’ system of 
international criminal justice, remains problematic. It is analytically dangerous simply to conflate the 
Chinese system, where the state is pre-eminent, with the essential elements of ‘restorative justice 
through mediation’ as we know it in the West and in international law, where the individual is 
preeminent.  
As mentioned earlier, the alternative or non-formal justice paradigms are developing a 
significant dimension of international criminal justice. China claims a reliance on mediation-based 
communitarian criminal justice delivery at a local level. Despite the fact that this mode of criminal 
justice usually is applied to less serious offending, it offers possible processes of participation and of 
judicial creativity, on which both the formal and less formal international justice paradigms could at 
least critically reflect. 
The restorative justice paradigm is where unique Chinese socio-legal traditions can be 
accountably displayed. On this perspective and its relevance to the Chinese culture, Braithwaite 
laments: 
What a pity that so few Western intellectuals are engaged with the possibilities for recovering, 
understanding, and preserving the virtues of Chinese restorative justice while studying how to 
check its abuses with a liberalising rule of law.68 
There have been, and still are powerful communitarian resolution practices available across the 
vast communitarian societies of China before and after the creation of the Communist Republic. These 
in essence represent the Confucian and communist ascription to social order above the individual and 
in this regard may be both critically evaluated as restorative, and yet criticised as outside the 
individualised rights environment of international human rights law, as well as conventional due 
process criminal procedure. Braithwaite notes that while the traditions of mediation have survived 
translation into the ‘mass line’ strategies of Maoist communism, the dangerous patriarchal and 
hierarchic communitarianism of Confucian social order also has prevailed. Does this have to be so? Is 
it not possible to maximise the humanitarian and harmonising potentials of bang-jiao where real 
reintegration replaces stigmatising shaming, as mass mediation takes the place of formal punishment? 
Another important consequence of critically interrogating Chinese communitarian traditions in 
contemporary criminal justice is the consequent reconfiguration of the rights debate. As noticed earlier, 
Chinese criminal justice has been long denigrated for failing to protect the individual rights of 
 
66  In relation to judicial independence see Mark Findlay, ‘Independence and the Judiciary in the PRC: Expectations for 
Constitutional Legality in China’, in Kanishka Jayasuriya (ed), Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia (Routledge, 1999), 281–99. 
67  Of necessity, this third section of the paper can only be selective in drawing themes from recent Chinese criminal procedure 
which may resonate with the development of international criminal justice. The very formative jurisprudence of the ICC and 
the procedural difficulties it is confronting, can do no more than suggest very broad fields where influence from hybrid 
traditions is possible. 
68  John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2002) 22. 
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offenders in particular. As with international criminal justice, however, this concentration on the 
individual tends to diminish the other significant rights consideration in criminal justice, which 
restorative models re-emphasise. Collective or communitarian rights considerations, important in 
Chinese mediation environments are also essential (if undervalued) in the confirmation of criminal 
justice internationally. The Chinese experience in valuing to even a diminishing degree the rights of the 
community might add important understandings to victim interests in international criminal justice.  
Zhong and Broadhurst argue that Chinese communitarian crime prevention has a rich 
tradition.69 In many respects it is the safety and social harmony of the neighbourhood which has 
motivated successful community crime prevention and social order programmes along with any 
consideration of victim protection or offender punishment. The crucial features of these programmes 
are their community organisational dimensions, the safety measures they incorporate (in collaboration 
with state organs), and their tendency to ‘civilise’ communities through moral education, the promotion 
of harmonious relationships, building community culture, and the purification of the environment.  
Yet as is the case with so many societies experiencing rapid and radical socioeconomic change, 
the nature of Chinese urban communities is fast changing. The traditional bonds which join community 
sentiment around the household and the family are strained through the itinerant migration which rages 
as a consequence of economic transition. Crime and the fear of crime accompany these changes. The 
conventional communitarian controls which were once sufficient to ensure social harmony and keep 
crime in check are as much at risk as are the communities they support, and the positive social 
consequences which they could claim. In this respect, the potential for the Chinese experience to 
inform the communitarian dimensions of international criminal justice goes beyond modelling or 
cultural convergence. The threats to communitarian control at work in China today, their consequences 
for the transformation of community crime control, and the effective measures to minimise their 
negative intrusion gives a critical case study from which much can be drawn. Criminal justice 
procedures in all contemporary traditions are a progress to statist control. In that regard even hybrid 
procedures in transition stand opposed to communitarian alternatives. The re-introduction of a 
communitarian commitment into criminal justice local or global must be mindful of the subversion it 
will face from more formalist institutional and process forms. This is particularly so, when the legal 
profession has a unique investment in, and management of more formalist criminal justice. 
For communitarianism to offer more than a didactic possibility from the critical experience of 
Chinese justice and social order (traditional or current) the Chinese need to rediscover, re-invigorate 
and institutionalise communitarian practice. In the face of a more individualised constitutionalised 
legality, and traditional social and community bonds under threat, this is a challenge for China as much 
as it is for international criminal justice. To take ‘Chinese communitarianism’, once institutionalised 
and tested, beyond a fine ideal for international criminal justice requires a critical re-evaluation of 
indigenous justice removed to the urban China of today.70 With the Chinese involvement in 
international criminal justice being passive, reactive and regressive, there may be potentials to 
influence procedural development but the nature of that influence beyond a declaratory frame, remains 
moot. 
VII Integrating Hybrid Traditions71 
The eventual and inescapable influence of Asian jurisdictions and their interpretations of social order 
and communitarian rights will draw the examination of developing international criminal justice into a 
wider cultural and political perspective. A consequence will be the invigoration of compatible 
aspirations for international criminal law and its development. 
It is the argument of this paper that unique procedural, and rights-based opportunities (and 
reflective challenges) appear in some of the hybrid criminal justice traditions of Asia. However, this 
influence has been largely lost to date by the reluctance of some of those traditions to engage with the 
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ICC and thereby the development of a global criminal jurisprudence.72 To swing this around politics in 
Asia will need to address: 
• the political and economic value in engaging with the ICC; 
• the opportunity to assert influence while world superpowers are ambivalent about ICC; 
• the importance of a richer mix of criminal justice procedural traditions in international 
criminal justice; 
• the significance for the development of domestic criminal justice through engagement with 
international criminal justice; and thereby 
• the involvement in global governance through new conceptions of ‘global community’. 
Such engagement is pursued radically by Asian states when it comes to regional politics and 
international economic order. China is playing a powerful role in regional and international relations. 
As with China’s eventual entry into GATT and the WTO, it is argued that a closer involvement in 
international criminal justice is matter of advancing rather than risking national interest through more 
influential positioning within global governance trends. Such a move would benefit China on a number 
of levels:  
• An important role for the ICC is to promote the improvement of domestic judicial systems. 
As a consequence of the new constitutional legality and its ascription to the rule of law 
voiced through China’s present Constitution, recent legislative developments in China have 
indicated a genuine commitment to raise the domestic institutions of justice to prominence 
within China’s national governance framework. For instance the Organic Law of the 
Peoples’ Courts in China is an attempt to confront the paradox of judicial independence in a 
one party state73. The new Criminal code and Criminal Procedure code, and their particular 
influence over the development of the legal profession in China, and the rights and 
responsibilities of trial participants can be nurtured through a closer association with the 
development of international criminal justice process; 
• The ICC should not run counter to UN rights charters to which China is a signatory. 
Particularly with the developing jurisdiction over crimes of aggression China would be wise 
to take a prominent role in this emerging jurisprudence. However, beyond domestic 
concerns; 
• China, as a developed exponent of restorative justice through mediation, and an exponent of 
transformed trial adjudication, can critically inform similar developmental trends in 
international criminal justice; and 
• As a dynamic hybrid criminal procedural tradition, the Chinese experience of criminal law 
and process can assist in the formulation of a truly international and responsive criminal 
jurisprudence. This can be achieved, without the distraction of an over-emphasis on the 
challenges to individual human rights in the Chinese delivery of domestic criminal justice. 
In any case, China is not an island when it comes to the development of its contemporary 
criminal justice practice. China has benefited from mutual cooperation programmes in the area of 
criminal justice. For instance, the Canada-China Criminal Justice Cooperation Programme is claimed 
to have significantly developed the procuracy.74 Internally, the Implementing International Standards 
for Criminal Justice in China Project75 shows that academic lawyers from three recognised Chinese law 
schools are concerned to address the practical challenges of bringing domestic criminal justice in 
practice to a level of international comparability. It is argued that this bilateral capacity building will 
make the achievement of a ‘rule of law’ context for criminal justice eventually attainable. 
Essential for the achievement of re-integrative and communitarian justice aspirations in China 
and internationally, is participation. From a victim perspective in particular, access to the formal 
institutions of international criminal justice, and thereby a lack of genuine integration is a growing 
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indictment of international criminal justice in practice. Certainly in terms of grassroots engagement 
with victim’s interests there is much that international criminal justice could draw from contemporary 
Chinese experience. In particular: 
(1) The processes of mobilising people to resolve social conflicts through mediation as a 
central plank of communitarian ju
(2) Enshrined victim’s rights to participate, such as to make accusations, attend court and 
give evidence regarding the nature and extent of victimisation, question defendants in 
court, argue the facts with the defendant and have some influence over the investigation. 
In the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law, however, these rights are based on retributive 
rather than restorative va
(3) Article 170 of the Criminal Procedure Law enables victims independently and 
individually to prosecute crimes where their personal and property rights have been 
infringed. The court may also institute judicial mediation in instances of private 
prosecution. Under art 172 the judge has both the role of facilitating the victim and the 
offender to reach resolution and reconciliation, and if the parties cannot resolve the 
matter, to act as an arbitrator and to issue a verdict. The importance of this merging of 
restorative and retributive justice within the discretion of the judge and in the setting of 
the courtroom cannot be overstated for the future of international criminal justice. While 
currently in China the discretion of the judge in such deliberations is more directed to 
avoid formal determinations of the offender’s criminal liability rather than compensating 
the victim or rehabilitating the offender, there is no reason why the development of this 
model in the international justice setting could not re-emphasise these other legitimate 
victim con
(4) Article 77 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides a formal opportunity for the victim to 
institute supplementary civil action against the perpetrator in parallel with the criminal 
proceedings. Interestingly, the same court will hear both the civil and criminal cases, and 
again may revert to mediation to resolve the compensation issue. If no agreement can be 
struck, the hearing of the civil claim is formally heard after criminal liability is settled. 
There is no provision for mitigating the offender’s criminal responsibility (and 
consequent sanction) if compensation is agreed to. Without this, certainly at the 
international level, there may be insufficient effective inducement for adequate 
compensation to victim communities from state perpetrators in particular; 
(5) In addition to judicial facilitation through mediation, the offender can be incorporated 
into the facilitation proce
(6) And crucially, in this cross-over of jurisdictional interests for the victim, the judge 
determines where his or her role as mediator ends and as adjudicator begins.  
The ‘danwei’ (work unit) system in China is transforming to take account of the new workforce 
landscape. Neighbourhood and residents’ committees remain in competition with the property 
management companies with their growing control over housing development in urban areas of China. 
Neighbourhood interests struggle against commercial priorities in order to maintain cohesive 
community-level control priorities. With the Chinese urban landscape transforming at an incredible rate 
over the past few decades, social control mechanisms such as mediation and bang-jiao are experiencing 
new and largely unexplored pressures. Even so, peoples’ mediation (tiao-jie), is being supplemented by 
administrative and judicial mediation opportunities. The state and the community are being required to 
incorporate in a model which was once only a communitarian concern. 
This unique case study of the exercise of judicial discretion over retributive and restorative 
process provides an empirical foundation for projections on transforming international trial decision-
making. It also identifies the competing interests at work which may compromise the promise of 
mediation and other restorative forms within a rights framework that tries to respect individual and 
community interests.  
Beyond China, other examples of procedural innovation open to the enhancement of 
international criminal justice include: 
• Enhance the communitarian ‘rights’ focus of international criminal justice — (importance 
of social order and community justice — communitarianism and tolerance
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• Contribute to the development of a new international criminal jurisprudence — (new 
notions of collective liability and crim
• Offer procedural options for the incorporation of retributive and restorative justice (Chinese 
trial mediation) 
• Show ways of expanding professional discretion in international criminal justice (Japanese 
prosecutorial interventions) 
In a wider sense of rights re-imagining, the importance of conventionally communitarian 
cultures such as those which survive at least in the spirit of modern Asian societies, cannot be 
diminished as an influence in: 
• Enhancing the wider ‘rights’ focus of international criminal justice, with the consequent 
importance for inclusive social order and community justice, more reliant on 
communitarianism and collective tolerance; 
• Contributing to the development of a new international criminal jurisprudence, with unique 
notions of collective liability, criminal organisation and resultant responsibility; 
• Offering procedural options for the incorporation of retributive and restorative justice 
through mechanisms incorporated into the modern trial such as conventional mediation; and 
• Revealing institutional ways of expanding professional discretion in international criminal 
justice such as through formalised but flexible prosecutorial early intervention. 
These themes assume that citizen participation will be evidence of criminal justice as a 
communitarian enterprise. Beyond the greater accountability (and consequent legitimacy) which such 
participation offers, the possibility of advancing victim interests will be more naturally achieved. 
Criminal justice participation divides between professional and stakeholder interest, and the 
involvement of the wider community as audience and authority. It is expected through directing 
international criminal justice to a victim constituency, victim interests will more effectively compete 
with professional expediency, and wider community participation will temper victim vengeance and 
contested self-interest. In all of this, international criminal justice, through a communitarian re-
imagining will be a more genuine protector of global community rather than the present narrow 
sectarian hegemony driving international criminal procedure. 
The reality of a shift in the risk security focus of globalisation as it moves from the war on terror 
to more generalisable climatic, health, sustainability, and economic and financial threats will be a 
search for more accommodating procedural justice models. In many ways the tiger Asian economies 
have weathered the pressures of catastrophic economic revolution and adjusted their regulatory 
frameworks accordingly. With the rest of the world their criminal justice procedural traditions must 
engage with global regulatory imperatives in the face of as yet unimaginable climate change: the new 
risk/security nexus. To equip such crisis regulatory engagement the transformation to global criminal 
justice must confront and incorporate the: 
• New, urgent and relentless risk/security agenda with a developing/third world focus; 
• More universalised cross-jurisdictional harm; 
• Move from modernisation to economic/market security — role of the Asian ‘tiger’ 
economies; 
• Recognition of pluralistic regulatory strategies where law may take a less prominent place 
— look at traditions where legality is complementary — rights communitarian; 
• Challenge to neo-liberal governance model as the single and appropriate paradigm for 
global justice and world 
